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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
-----0000000-----
JONATHAN LITTLE and HANNAH 
LITTLE, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
v. 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, Case No. 18113 
UTAH STATE DIVISION OF 
FAMILY SERVICES, 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
-----0000000-----
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
-----0000000-----
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondeilts, JONATHAN and HANNAH LITTLE, 
filed an action in the District Court of Salt Lake County, for 
the wrongful death of their natural daughter, JENNIFER, as a 
result of the negligence of the Defendant-Appellant, Utah State 
Division of Family Services. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the District Court, sitting with-
out a jury on August 12 and 13, 1981. The District Court found 
that the Division of Family Services had a duty to protect JEN-
NIFER LITTLE from harm they knew or should have known was likely, 
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that.the Division of Family Services breached such duty, and 
that JENNIFER'S death was the direct and prox~mate result of 
Defendant's breach of said duty. The Court entered judgment 
against the Defendant in favor of the Plaintiffs in the amount 
of $20,000.00, plus funeral expenses and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek to affirm the District Court's ruling 
and its judgment entered in favor of JONATHAN and HANNAH LITTLE. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Statement of Facts presented by the Appellant does 
not fairly and accurately describe the evidence at trial, and 
Respondents therefore submit their own Statement of Facts. 
On March 16, 1977, a Warrant and Order of Temporary 
Placement directed to JENNIFER LITTLE was issued by the Second 
District Juvenile Court based upon a Petition filed by LOIS M. 
RUDD of the Division of Family Services. JENNIFER'S parents, 
JONATHAN and HANNAH LITTLE, appeared at the Juvenile Court hear-
ing on April 6, 19.77, without counsel and admitted the allega-
tions of the Petition. The Utah State Division of Family Services 
was granted custody and guardianship of JENNIFER LITTLE pursuant 
to an Order of the Second District Juvenile Court. The Juvenile 
Court made the following findings: 
Said child is dependent through no fault of the 
parents in that: (1) said minor has not developed 
properly and manifests autistic behavior: (2) 
said minor is in need of specialized assistance 
-2-
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which the parents are emotionally unable to pro-
vide. (Exhibit 1) 
On April 25, 1977, JENNIFER was placed in the home of RUSSEL 
and PEARL MEIK, therapeutic foster parents for handicapped child-
ren and children with special problems. The MEIKS had insuffic-
ient special training for caring for children with autistic 
behavior. (R. 323, 61). Upon placement in the MEIK foster home, 
JENNIFER began periodically hitting her head against the floor 
and walls, and pulled hair from her scalp causing herself constant 
injury (R. 297). Mrs. MEIK would keep JENNIFER nearby and hold 
her during head-banging episodes. This conduct was reported by 
Mrs. MEIK to CONNIE COWLEY, the Division of Family Services case 
worker who had been assigned responsibility for JENNIFER'S case. 
CONNIE COWLEY observed bruises on JENNIFER'S face (R. 235). 
The foster care worker, however, did not instruct Mrs. MEIK to 
take any further precaution (R. 225). Mrs. LITTLE also expressed 
her ·concerns about JENNIFER'S condition to CONNIE COWLEY (R. 
235). JENNIFER LITTLE, two and one-half (2~) years old, died 
on June 4, 1977, as a result of injuries to her head (R. 280). 
At the time of her death, JENNIFER had bruises on her face and 
body which were of various ages and in various stages of healing. 
(R. 286). On that day, JENNIFER had been left in the care of 
another foster child living in the home, FLOYD HOOTEN, a mildly 
retarded seventeen (17) year old boy (R. 217). According to 
the police reports which were admitted as evidence, FLOYD HOOTEN 
may have hit JENNIFER several times on the head on the day she 
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died because she was fussing about going to the bathroom. No 
charges, however, were ever brought against him. (Exhibits 27 
& 28) . 
In December, 1978, JONATHAN and HANNAH LITTLE, Respond-
ents, filed suit against the Utah Division of Family Services, 
alleging a course of negligent conduct upon the part of the Ap-
pellant which culminated in the death of their daughter. The 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss (April 5, 1979), based in part 
on th~ Governmental Immunity Act, was denied as to the Divi~ion 
of Family Services, the District Court finding that the discre-
tionary function exception did not apply. (R. 62-64). After a 
two day trial, the District Court found that the Division of 
Family Services had a duty to protect JENNIFER, that the duty 
was breached, and that her death was proximately caused thereby. 
Judgment was entered for Plaintiffs and damages awarded in the 
amount of $20,000.00, plus funeral expenses and costs. (R. 
457-463, 158-162). 
POINT ONE 
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED 
THE APPELLANT DIVISION OF FAMILY 
SERVICE'S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED 
ON THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT. 
Appellant, Division of Family Services, seeks absolute 
immunity for negligent actions performed by its employees and 
agents in the foster care program. Such a narrow interpretation 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-1 et _seq., 
-4-
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is neither necessary or desirable. This Court has noted that 
the legislature, in drafting the Act, intended ''to allow the 
Court flexibility and adaptability in fashioning consistent and 
rational limits to governmental immunity." Staniford v. Salt 
~ke CitL_Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1980). Such a recog-
nition is fully consistent with the need to balance the injury 
suffered by the individual citizen against the effect which the 
burden of recovery places upon the effective administration of 
government. Weighing these considerations, Respondent contends: 
1. The foster care program of the Division of Family 
Services does not perform a governmental function within the 
meaning of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
2. Even if the foster care program is recognized as 
a governmenal function, the discretionary function exception 
to the general waiver of immunity for negligence does not apply 
in this case. 
A 
THE MAINTENANCE OF A FOSTER CARE 
PROGRAM IS NOT A GOVERNMENTAL FUNC-
TION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
states: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this Act, 
all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally owned 
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental 
health care facility. 
-5-
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In Staniford v. Salt Lake City Corp., ~upra, this Court held 
that the test for determining whether a particular state or muni-
cipal activity was a governmental function, depended upon if 
it was "of such a unique nature that it can only be performed 
by a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core 
of governmental activity." 605 P.2d at 1237. The Court pointed 
out that while the new standard broadened governmental liability, 
the Governmental Immunity Act did authorize the procuring of 
governmental insurance protection, the cost of which could be 
included within the budget of governmental entities, Id at 1237. 
In Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 
1981), the Plaintiff brought suit against a city when her daugh-
ter's sled collided with an upright timber implanted in concrete 
on a golf course used for $ledding during the winter. The Dis-
trict Court dismissed the case on the basis of governmental im-
munity. This Court, in reversing that dismissal, reaffirmed 
the validity of the "uniqueness test" for determining that scope 
of governmental function. The Court further clarified the para-
meters of the test by noting: 
The first part of the Standiford test - activity 
of such a unique nature that it can only be per-
formed by a governmental agency - does not refer 
to what ~overnmPnt may do, but to what government 
alone must do, 629 P.2d at 434 (emphasis added). 
In both Standiford and Johnson, the Court held that recreational 
activities maintained by a municipality were not of such a unique 
nature that they could only be conducted by a governmental ag-
-6-
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ency. 
Whether the maintenance of a city sewer system was 
essential to the core of governmental activity was at issue in 
Thomas v. Clearfield City, No. 17338, filed February 24, 1982 
(Utah 1982). In this case, a blockage in the sewer line caused 
sewer water to collect in the Plaintiff's basement. The District 
Court granted the city's Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis 
of governmental immunity. In reversing the ruling of the District 
Court, the Court noted that even though the legislature had pro-
vided municipalities with the option to enforce mandatory hookups 
into city sewer systems, "it does not follow from this that the 
function automatically qualifies for governmental immunity as 
'essential to the core of governmental activity.'" The Court 
noted, "(i)t is not even mandatory that a governmental entity 
perform these functions." No. 17338 at 3,4. 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act is similar to that 
of the State of Michigan. Staniford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
608 P.2d at 1236. In Robison v. City of Sterling Heights, 290 
N.W.2d 43 (Mich. App. 1979), the Plaintiff was injured while 
working on a water main construction project for the Defendant 
municipality and brought action for damages. The trial Court 
granted Summary Judgment for the Defendant on the ground of gov-
ernrnental immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
Court: 
We conclude that . . . the operation of a muni-
cipal water system is not a governmental func-
-7-
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tion. Since the government is not the only en-
tity involved in supplying the public with drink-
ing water, it is not an operation that can be 
effectively accomplished only by the government. 
290 N.W. 2d at 45 
The Court further went on to note that allowing tort 
liability would not result in an impermissible interference with 
effective government. Potential liability should simply be taken 
into consideration as a cost of performing the particular service. 
290 N.W. 2d at 45. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals refined the governmental 
function test in Churchwell v. Board of Regents of the University 
of Michigan. 296 N.W.2d 75 (Mich. App. 1980). In this case 
the Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging she sustained injuries 
through negligent treatment of the University of Michigan Hos-
pital, and the trial Court dismissed on the basis of governmental 
immunity. The Michigan Supreme Court in Parker v. Highland Park, 
404 Mich. 183, 272, N.W.2d 413 (1978), had held that the d~ily 
operation of a hospital does not constitute a governmental func-
tion. The Defendant sought to distinguish Parker by arguing 
that the University of Michigan Hospital was a teaching hospital 
affiliated with a legislatively mandated medical school, and 
had no counterpart in the private sector. 296 N.W.2d at 78. 
The Court of Appeals did not agree: 
I I I I I 
We do not find that the purpose, planning and 
earring out of the day to day operation of the 
University Hospital can be effectively accomplish· · · · · · 
ed only by the Government. We recognize that, 
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from an economic standpoint, perhaps the operation 
of a medical school can only be so effectuated. 
This, in itself, is controvertible, however, when 
one considers that private institutions for the 
training of other health care professionals, 
such as dentists and nurses, do exist in the 
state. In any event, in applying the definition 
of governmental function, we must focus upon the 
precise operation sought to be held immune rather 
than overall or principal de~rtmental operation. 
296 N.W.2d at 78 (emphasis added). 
The test for determining whether a particular govern-
mental activity falls within the governmental function category 
hinges upon whether the activity is of such a value that it must 
be performed by the government. The criteria used to determine 
if the function must be performed by the government relates to 
whether the service being performed has any equivalent in the 
private sector and whether it is mand~tory that the government 
perform the service. In the case before the Court, these criteria 
are not established. It is not mandatory that the State perform 
all foster care and other agencies also provide such care. There 
are at least three private agencies in Utah that maintain estab-
lished foster care programs: Childrens Service Society of Utah, 
LDS Social Services, and the Catholic Community Service. Section 
78-3a-39(11) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) specifically empowers the 
Juvenile Court to release children to the care of an individ-
ual or to a private agency or institution. 
This Court should focus its analysis upon the precise 
governmental activity sought to be held immune rather than the 
n 
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overall departmental operation. Respondent does not argue that 
every activity of the Division of Family Services does not fall 
within the category of a governmental function. The operation 
of the foster care program by the Division of Family Services 
is not "so essential to the core of governmental activity" that 
it "must" be performed by the state government. The foster care 
program is not a uniquely governmental activity, and has counter-
parts in the private sector. It does not meet the criteria needed 
to establish it as a governmental function within the meaning 
of Utah Code Annotated, 63-30-3. Mere legislative recognition 
does not automatically qualify the activity for governmental 
immunity, Thomas v. Clearfield Citl, supra, at 3. 
B 
EVEN IF THE FOSTER CARE PROGRAM 
IS RECOGNIZED AS A GOVERNMENTAL FUNC-
TION, THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION 
EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL WAIVER OF 
IMMUNITY FOR NEGLIGENCE DOES NOT 
APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
The immunity from suit for the negligent performance 
of a governmental function is not absolute. The grant of immun-
ity is limited by Section 63-3-10(1) of the Utah Code Annotated 
which states: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused by a neg-
ligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of his employment except if the 
injury: 
(1) arises out of the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercize or perform a discre-
tionary function, whether or not the discretion 
is abused. 
, (\ 
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In deciding whether any particular governmental func-
tion is discretionary and hence immune to suit, this Court has 
adopted the planning-operational test, Carroll v. State Road 
Commission, 27 Qtah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972). In applying 
this test, the Court, "has followed the lead of cases interpret-
ing the Federal Tort Claim Act.'' Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 
519 (Utah 1980). 
The United States Supreme Court first analyzed the 
discretionary function exception in Dalehite v. United States, 
346 U.S. 15 (1953). The case arose from a fire and explosion 
in Texas which killed more than 500 persons. With two members 
of the Court not participating, and over the strong dissent of 
Justice Jackson, a four member majority concluded that discretion 
"includes determination made by executives or administration 
in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operation. 
Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is 
discretion." 346 U.S. at 35-36. 
The broad definition of discretion pronounced by the 
Court in Dalehite was narrowed somewhat two years later in Indian 
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). Plaintiff sought 
to hold the government liable for the negligent failure to main-
tain a lighthouse with the result that a ship and barge went 
aground and were damaged. In reversing the lower Court's dismissal 
on the basis of governmental immunty, the Supreme Court held 
that the original policy decision to implement the operation 
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of the lighthouse was discretionary. Once parties began to act 
in reliance on the lighthouse, _however, the government was obli-
gated to use due care in the maintenance of the light or to give 
warning that it was not functioning. 350 U.S. at 69. 
In Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1972), the Plaintiffs 
claimed that the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Docu-
ments invaded their privacy by publishing certain derrogatory 
documents for use by congress and others. The Court held that 
while the Defendants were acting within the scope of their duties, 
the performance of these duties was not a discretionary function. 
The Court reasoned that mere affiliation with legislative action 
did not confer immunity. 412 U.S. at 323-24. To determine what 
areas of governmental conduct should be considered discretionary, 
the Court advised "a discerning inquiry into whether the contri-
bution of immunity to effective government in_particular context 
outweighs the perhaps recurring harm to individual citizens." 
412 U.S. at 320. 
The Supreme Court clearly considers the initial decis-
ion making and implementation of high level policy judgment to 
be a protected discr~tionary function. A charge in the course 
of the Missouri River, Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 
(8th Cir. 1950), or a decision to conduct tests of nuclear ex-
plosions, Bartholomae v. United States, 135 F.Supp. 651 (S.D. 
Calif. 1955), are examples of such policy judgments which have 
been granted immunity. The distinction between the planning 
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and preparation of governmental programs and the subsequent oper-
ation of those programs has been concisely summarized by the 
Ninth Circuit in United Airlines, Inc., v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 
(9th Cir. 1964), cert denied 375 U.S. 951, 85 S.Ct. 452, 13 
L.Ed.2d 549: 
discretionary to undertake firefighting, light-
house, rescue, or wrecked ship marking services, 
but not discretionary to conduct such operations 
negligently; discretionary to admit a patient 
to an army hospital, but not discretionary to 
treat the patient in a negligent manner; discre-
tionary to establish a post office at a parti-
cular location, but not to negligently fail to 
install handrails; discretionary to establish 
control towers at airport and to undertake air 
traffic separation, but not to conduct the same 
negligently ... 
335 F.2d at 393, footnote omitted. Also see 
Prosser on Torts. 4th Ed., pp. 972 - 74. 
The Federal Courts have applied the planning - opera-
tional test to a variety of factual circumstances in an attempt 
to determine what constitutes a discretionary function. In Grif-
fin v. United States, 505 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974), the Plaintiff 
became a quadrapalegic as a result of ingesting live virus polio 
vaccine which - though it had been subjected to testing for safe-
ty - had been approved for release to the public in a manner 
inconsistent with H.E.W. regulations. The Court of Appeals up-
held the District Court's finding that there was no discretionary 
function involved and stated: 
The fact that judgment of government officials 
occur in areas requiring professional expert eval-
uation does not necessarily remove those judgments 
from the examination of courts by classifying 
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them as discretionary acts ... This Court is 
fully capable of scrutinizing the processes and 
conclusions of the decision-makers by the usual 
standards applied to cases of professional negli-
gence. 
500 F.2d at 1066-67, citations omitted. 
In Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975), 
a passenger plane being hijacked to the Bahamas, stopped to refuel 
in Jacksonville, Florida. The FBI initiated a gunbattle with 
the hijacker which provoked the hijacker to shoot a woman, the 
pilot and himself. A survivor brought suit and the District 
Court found for the Plaintiffs, holding that the "discretionary 
function" exception was not applicable. The Court of Appeals, 
in upholding the ruling of the District Court, rejected the argu-
ment that the exercise of "judgment" during the performance of 
a governmental activity was the crucial factor "which immunizes 
the United States from the liability for the torts of its empoy-
ees." 522 F.2d at 995. The Court instead focused its inquiry 
upon whether the conduct of the FBI agents was involved in the 
making of policy. The Court noted that FBI hijacking policy 
had been formulated before the hijacking and it did not consider 
the actions of the chief agent in directing the handling of the 
situation as ad hoc formulation of government policy. 522 F.2d 
at 997. 
Case workers for the foster care program exercise their 
duties with reference to a pre-existing set of policy guidelines: 
the guidelines for Substitute Care (Children) contained in the 
"Direct Services Section" of the Family Services Manual (April, 
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1980). These guidelines are far from nebulous. For example, 
Section VSCF 310 Pre-Placement and Placement Activities, states: 
"When the placement appears to be in the best interest of the 
child, the workers perform the following.activities." After 
this statement there are listed twenty (20) activities the case 
workers should perform, including ... 
6. Determine and select with parents, as far 
as possible, the kind of substitute care place· 
ment to best suit the child's needs, using 
the guidelines for placement ... 
14. Make an application for a medical card on 
Court adjudicated children . . . 
17. Shares information with the foster arents 
to ena e t em to provi e appropriate care, 
to understand and be able to deal with the 
child's behavior, and meet the child's needs. 
(emphasis added). 
The decision for placement of a child in "special fos-
ter care", as was the case with JENNIFER LITTLE, does not rest 
with the judgment and discretion of the case worker. When a 
case worker makes a recommendation for special foster care, Sec-
~ 
tion VSCF 320 Screening for Special Care ( 1), informs us: ''The 
district staff reviews the request and approves or denies the 
placement." 
The treatment accorded a foster child is also not 
based solely on the discretion and judgment of the case worker. 
Section VSCF401 Treatment Plan, states: 
1. Within 30 days of receiving a case, the work-
er, with the family, will make a treatment 
plan to be shared with the Court .. 
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2. The treatment plan should specifically state 
what parents are to do, what the child is 
to do~ and what the worker is to do to re-
solve the problem. The plan shall state the 
tiffie limit for accomplishing this objection 
of the plan, resources to be used, and shall 
indicate the proposed behavioral outcome of 
the services. (emphasis added). 
3. The plan is to be the basis of all services 
to the child and family ... 
The implementation of a treatment plan is provided for in Sect-
ion VSCF 402 Supervision, which states: 
1. During the time that the child is in foster 
care, the worker will carry out the provision 
of the treatment plan. 
2. The worker helps the foster parent, child 
and natural parents resolve the problems which 
arise during care ... 
3. The worker maintains ongoing contact with 
the foster parents at a minimum of once a 
month. 
4. The worker reviews progress toward goals of 
the treatment plan, and reviews the plan as 
needed. 
Case workers for the foster care program perform their duties 
with reference to a published and clearly articulated set of 
guidelines, and thus do not engage in formulating departmental 
policy goals. 
This issue of the discretionary nature of a profession-
al's supervision of human beings in accordance with government 
promulgated guidelines is ~drnittedly a difficult one. The var-
ious dimensions of this problem, however, were carefully explor-
ed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in PaY.!_on v. United 
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States, 636 f.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1981). The Plaintiffs, the husband 
and children of a murder victim, alleged that a federal prisoner 
had been released from custody in disregard of medical reports 
confirming him as a homocidal psychotic, and that shortly there-
after, he brutally murdered the victim. The Court of Appeals, 
in reversing the District Court's dismissal, called for a balanc-
ing test is assessing the nature and quality of the discretion 
involved in the planning-operational distinction. Applying this 
test to the facts before it, the Court concluded: 
The question then becomes, where does the dis-
cretion of the Parole Board lie? It is important 
to note at this point that the a11egatrons attack 
only the application of the Parole Boards guide-
lines to Whisenhant, and not the guidelines them-
selves. The exercise of polic! making discretion 
by-the Board occurred in f ormu ating and imRle-
menting the guidelines criteria . . . Such poT-
Tcy" decisions, whether good or bad, are probably 
exempt under Dalehite. But surely the applica-
tion of their guiaeTI'nes to Whisenhart is not. 
~uch an act has none of the political policy over-
tones that exist in certain law enforcement sit-
uations, such as enforcing integration ... 
The choices involved in applying the guidelines 
and releasing a particular person are of another 
sort. Whether characterized as "operational", 
"day-to-day" or some other label, they do not 
achieve the status of a basic policy evaluation 
and decision. 
636 F.2d at 146-47, citations omitted (emphasis 
added) . 
The Court also noted that Plaintiff's loss could be described 
as severe and isolated, and that such a loss was difficult to 
justify as the risk of almost any governmental activity. 636 
F. 2d at 1145. 
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A similar balancing test was used by the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in an attempt to delineate the mode of discre-
tion exercised at the operational level from true policy formula-
tion. In Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977), the 
Plaintiff brought action for medical malpractice against an Air 
Force physician alleging that the Defendant had negligently treat-
ed her for conditions relating to her pregnancy. The Court of 
Appeals, in reversing the District Court's dismissal, followed 
the lead of the Supreme Court in Doe v. McMillan, supra, and 
directed its analysis first to deciding if Defendant's actions 
were discretionary, and then to balancing the redress of the 
harm suffered by the individual against the burden this places 
on effective government. 557 F.2d at 737. The Court adduced 
the following test to distinguish discretionary from operational 
functions: ''Gener~lly speaking, a duty is discretionary if it 
involves judgment, planning or policy decisions. It is not dis-
cretionary if it involves enforcement or administration of a 
mandatory duty at the operational level, even if professional 
expert evaluation is required.'' 557 F.2d at 737-38. The Court 
was careful to distinguish the type of discretion exercised by 
a professional during the course of his or her official employ-
ment, and the type of departmental policy formulation which is 
granted immunity: 
Plaintiff's Complaint merely charges Defendant 
with the negligent practice of medicine: it does 
not ask the District Court to review a federal 
health policy. We recognize that medical treat-
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ment by a government doctor involves jud~ment 
and discretion. This does not resolve t e matter, 
however, because rneoTcal treatment by a govern-
ment doctor does not necessarily involve govern-
mental discretion. 
557 F.2d at 738 (emphasis added). 
The Court next focused o~ the competing interest be-
tween the citizen's recovery for harm and the burden of their 
recovery upon the government. The policy consideration which 
the Court felt weighed heaviest in favor of recovery was the 
gravity of harm to the individual citizen. Where this is suf-
ficiently grave, it should preclude immunity. In evaluating 
the detrimental effect which the disallowing of immunity would 
have upon governmental action, the Court observed: 
Effective government would not suffer excessive-
ly if monetary compensation were permitted be-
cause the alleged wrongful conduct does not in-
volve politically sensitive judgment or discretion-
ary governmental acts. Granting damages to Plain-
tiff would not tend to constrict governmental 
functioning in an area where prompt governmental 
action and snap governmental judgments are neces-
sary. 
557 F.2d at 739. 
As the Court noted in Payton, the loss of a loved one is a severe 
and isolating injury,. and under the balancing test as developed 
by the federal courts, such a harm as suffered by JONATHAN and 
HANNAH LITTLE should preclude immunity. The Respondents are 
not asking the Court to review state foster care policy. What 
the LITTLES do assert is that the acts and omissions which brought 
about JENNIFER'S death resulted from the negligent application 
of the foster care policy guidelines, and that as such, these 
choices can only be characterized as operational. 
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The California Courts have so held. In Elton v. Coun~ 
of Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1083, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970) a Court 
reversed a dismissal of a Complaint and ruled that a cause of 
action was stated by a child against a county, the Department 
of Social Welfare, and the Probation Department of negligence 
in placing the child in a home where she was beaten and that 
certain regulations had not been complied with, resulting in 
injury to the child. The Court noted: 
Decision for the maintenance, care, and super-
visiions of a dependent child, or in connection 
with the child's placement in a particular -home, 
may entail the exercise of discretion in a liber-
al sense, but such determinations do not achieve 
the level of basic policy decision and thus do 
not, under Government Code Section 820.2 preclude 
judicial inquiry into whether negligence of pub-
lic employees was involved . . 
It was noted above that the planning-operational test, 
as it evolved in the federal courts, was adopted by Utah in Car-
roll v~ State Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 
(1972). Plaintiffs had alleged that they accidently drove on 
to an abandoned highway and suffered injury as a result of the 
negligence of the road commission in using earthen beams to block 
the abandoned road. The trial Court held that the discretionary 
exception to the Governmental Immunity Act was not applicable. 
This Court, in upholding that ruling, decided that the road super· 
visor's decision to use beams to block the road "was not a basic 
policy decision essential to the realization or accomplishment 
of some basi~ governmental policy, program or objective . . . 
His determination may properly be characterized as one at the 
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operational level of decision making . . " 496 P.2d at 891-92. 
The planning-operational test was applied again in 
Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), when the Plaintiffs 
brought suit for property damage resulting from n~gligent con-
struction of a highway project. The Court, in upholding the 
liability of the state, noted that while the decision to build 
the highway and specifying its general location were discretion-
ary functions, the preparing of plans and specifications and 
the supervision of the manner in which the work was carried out 
could not be labeled discretionary. 541 P.2d at 1120. 
This Court, however, in Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 
(Utah 1976), chose not to apply the planning-operational test. 
The Plaintiffs were the children of a murder victim and brought 
suit against the state alleging it was negligent for allowing 
a prisoner on its work-release progrm to escape~ The majority 
opinion, rest~d upon both the discretionary function exception 
and the exception in Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-10(10) 
which retains immunity if the injury "arises out of the incar-
ceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail 
or other place of legal confinement. . " In summarily deny-
ing relief to the Plaintiffs the Court did not discuss Carroll 
or Andrus. Justice Maughan, however, in a forceful dissert, 
made the following observation: 
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Whether we have work release programs, or not, 
is a basic policy decision, and discretionary 
with the state, insofar as they are constitution-
ally permissible. No question is raised against 
that proposition. But, it does not follow that 
the escape of the prisoner from the work release 
program is also discretionary with the State. 
When we commend the work release program we com-
mend a discretionary act taken at the planning 
level, the basic policy making level. Here we· 
are not concerned with decisions made on that 
level, we are concerned with circumstances occur-
ring and decisions made on the operational leyel. 
This Court has clearly made that distinction in 
Carroll v. State Road Commission. 
546 P.26 at 245. 
Faced with a similar fact situation, the Nevada Supreme 
Court applied the planning-operational test in State v. Silvia, 
478 P.2d 591 (Nev. 1970). The Plaintiffs, husband and wife, 
brought suit to recover damages resulting from the rape of the 
wife by an escaped inmate of a state run honor camp. In uphold-
ing the trial verdict for Plaintiffs, the Court observed: "Al-
though the selection of irimates for honor camp service may pri-
marily be a discretionary act, the manner in which the camp is 
supervised and controlled is mainly operational in nature." 
478 P.2d at 593. 
In a series of recent cases, Utah has again relied 
upon the planning-operational test. When the State Tax Comn1ission 
sold the Plaintiff's motorcycle without notifying him, after 
the motorcycle was impounded and being held as evidence against 
the person charged with its theft, this Court in Morrison v. 
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Salt Lake City Corp., 600 P.2d 553 (Utah 1979), held that the 
decision to sell the motorcycle did not involve an exercise of 
basic policy evaluation, but was rather operational, 600 P.2d 
at 555. In Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), the 
Plaintiffs, injur~d in an automobile accident, brought suit ag-
ainst the state claiming that the state had negligently designed 
the traffic control light at the intersection. This Court, apply-
ing the planning-operational test, reversed the trial Court's 
ruling that the state was immune. The Court concluded: 
Although the act of the State involved in design-
ing the traffic control system involves some degree 
of discretion as to almost all acts, the design 
of the traffic control system does not involve 
the basic "policy making level". 
618 P.2d at 53. 
As can be observed from the preceding cases, where 
the issue of a discretionary function arises out of a technical 
program rather than a program concerning the case and safety 
of human beings, the line drawing between the planning and oper-
ational levels is less complicated. The Utah Code, however, 
specifically withdraws certain non-technical governmental programs 
from judicial scrutiny in this regard. The government is exempt 
from liability for any injury arising out of the incarceration 
of any person in a penal custodial program, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 63-30-10(10). The planning-operational test has little 
impact on this area of governmental activity. 
An effective application of the planning-operational 
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test to a non-technical program, however, was clearly demonstrated 
by this Court in Frank v. State, 63 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). The 
Plaintiff in this case brought suit against the state for negli-
gence in the death of his son, Jack Alger. Alger had been under-
going treatment at the University of Utah Medical Center, and, 
notwithstanding the fact that Alger informed those responsible 
for his care that he had previously attempted to take his own 
life, no action was taken to restrain or treat Alger; on the 
I 
\ 
contrary, he was permitted to leave the hospital. Soon after, 
he committed suicide. The Plaintiff's suit was dismissed by 
the trial Court on the basis of governmental immunity. This 
Court reversed and drew the distinction between the exercise 
of operational level discretion necessary in any non-technical 
program, and planning level discretion which applies when organi-
zational or program-wide goals are formulated and implemented, 
concluding: 
The Court recognizes the high degree of careful 
observation, evaluation, and educated judgment 
reflected in any modern medical prognosis, and 
makes no suggestion that a large measure of "dis-
cretion", as commonly defined, is not involved. 
The exception to the statutory waiver h~re under 
consideration, however, was intended to shield 
those governmental acts and decision impacting 
on large numbers of ~ople in a myriad of unfore-
seeable ways from inaTvidual and class legaT act-
ions, the continual 'fllreat Of whiCFlwould make 
public admini~tration all but impossible. The 
one-to-one dealings of phySTCian and patient in 
no way reflect their public policy making posture, 
and should not be given shelter under the Act. 
613 P.2d at 520 (emphasis added). 
As was the case in Frank, no action was taken by those 
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charged with the duty to care for JENNIFER LITTLE, to adequately 
protect her when they knew or should have known that harm was 
likely or to train the foster parents or to provide them with 
the necessary, proper equipment to handle JENNIFER'S problems. 
In line with the holding of Frank, Respondents contend that the 
negligent acts and omissions which resulted in JENNIFER'S death 
can in no sense be considered "governmental acts and decision 
impacting on large_ numbers of people", or as reflecting a "public 
policy-making posture". The acts and omissions resulted from 
the performance of policy guidelines and not their formulation, 
and as such are activities conducted at the operational level. 
The Respondents have suffered an egregious and isolat-
ing harm. Such a loss as this cannot be justified as incidental 
to the functioning of the foster care program. The foster care 
program is not fraught with political or policy overtones and 
the imposition of liability in this case will not be overly bur-
densome upon the program. The Governmental Immunity Act auth-
orizes the procurement of insurance protection. The Respondents 
do not seek to have the Court pass judgment upon the policies 
of the foster care program. They merely seek just compensation 
for their loss. 
POINT TWO 
TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FIND-
ING THAT THE DIVISION OF FAMILY 
SERVICES HAD A DUTY TO PROTECT AND 
CARE FOR JENNIFER LITTLE AND THAT 
THE DUTY WAS BREACHED. 
On April 6; 1977, the Utah State Division of Family 
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Services was granted custody and guardianship of JENNIFE~ LITTLE 
pursuant to an Order of the Second District Juvenile Court. 
Section 78-3a-39(3) U.C.A., gives the Juvenile Court the power 
to: 
(v)est Legal custody of the child in the (State 
Division of Family Services/State Department of 
Social Services) or the public agency, depart-
ment, or institution, or in a child placement 
agency as defined herein, for placement in a foster 
home or other facility ... 
Section 78-3a-2(7) of the Utah Code (1953 as amended) defines 
"legal custody" as: 
a relationship embodying the following rights 
and duties: A right to physical custody of a child; 
the ri~ht and duty_to protect, train, and disci-
pline im; the duty_to provide him with food, 
clothing, shelter, education, and ordinary medical 
care; the right to determine whe~e and with whom 
Ke--sfiall live, and the right, in an em~rgency, 
to authorize emergency or other extraordinary 
care. (emphasis added). 
This Court stated in Wilson v. Family Services Division 
Region Two, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976), that once there has been 
an adjudication depriving the natural parents of the custody 
of their child and the child is placed in the custody of Family 
Services, "the latter then has the responsibility and authority 
to safeguard the welfare of the child, including the placement 
in a home for that purpose. " 554 P.2d at 229 (emphasis ad-. . 
ded). 
The important policy consideration underlying the "res-
ponsibility and authority to safeguard the welfare of the child" 
was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in In Re Tanner, 549 
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P.2d 703 (Utah 1976). In this case a child under the guardian-
ship of Family Services, sought judicial enforcement of his right 
to dental care. The Court, in upholding the child's right to 
care, noted that there is a "concept inherent in our law respect-
ing children; that in a civilized society, all children, even 
those without parents, or a home, should be provided not only 
food, clothing and shelter, but other basic needs, incuding neces-
sary medical and dental care." 549 P.2d at 705. 
The difficulties of JENNIFER'S head banging, and the 
fact that she was pulling her own hair out to the extent that 
she had a bald spot near the crown of her head, were communicat-
ed to the supervising care worker. The caseworker herself ob-
served JENNIFER on May 17, 1977 (R. 235, 459). Because of JENNI-
FER'S special problems, which were known by the Division of Family 
Services prior to and during _placement, the statutory and jud-
icially recognized duties were augmented. This is particularly 
true where JENNIFER was removed from her parents through no fault 
of theirs in order to provide her with "specialized assistance." 
To argue that the State owes a limited duty under these circum-
stances simply defies logic. 
The rule stated ~y this Court in Wheeler v. Jones, 
19 Utah 2d 392, 431 P.2d 985 (1967), relating to the scope of 
duty where the safety of children is concerned, must certainly 
be amplified where the child is under a known disability. The 
Court stated: 
Negligence is the breach of the duty to use due 
care under the circumstances of the situation. 
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when children are involved, the duty to look out 
for their safety is increased, and failure to 
make a given discovery might be _negligence when 
children are involved and not negligence if adults 
only are affected. 
431 P.2d at 988. 
JENNIFER LITTLE was known to have autistic tendencies. 
The Division of Family Services was under a legal duty to place 
her in a home able to safeguard her welfare. This was not done. 
Mrs. MEIK, the foster mother, was never informed of the specifics 
of JENNIFER'S behavioral problem. When she informed the supervis-
ing case worker, CONNIE COWLEY, of ·the difficulty she was encoun-
tering, she was simply told that JENNIFER should be evaluated. 
(R. 209-210). The evaluation eventually took place, but the 
results of the evaluation were never explained to Mrs. Meik. 
(R. 211). Furthermore, even though Mrs. MEIK had received some 
training to become a therapeutic foster parent, her ability to 
deal with JENNIFER'S head-banging was limited because she had 
never before had a child with problems like JENNIFERS in her 
home ( R. 207) . 
The seriousness of JENNIFER'S head-banging cannot be 
overemphasized. Mrs. MEIK stated that for most of the time JEN-
NIFER was in her home she had bruises on her forehead, on her 
cheekbones, and below her eyes. (R. 213). When asked why she 
kept JENNIFER'S potty chair in the hallway, Mrs. MEIK answered: 
"Because I was afraid· she would throw herself forward off that 
potty chair and hit her face on the tub or the wash basin or 
the toilet in the bathroom". (R. 214). The head-banging commenc· 
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ed only after JENNIFER'S placement with DFS. (R. 178). 
The duty of the Division of Family Services in this 
instance extended beyond merely placing JENNIFER in a therapeu-
tic foster home. The duty clearly extended to placing her with 
therapeutic foster parents who were adequately trained to deal 
with children with autistic tendencies and head-banging problems, 
and at the least to provide the foster parents with meaningful 
advice and whatever equipment they might need to prevent harm. 
In Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah 2d 371, 503, P.2d 139 
(1972) the Plaintiff brought an action for damages to his home 
by irrigation water which flooded there after use by the Defend-
ant. The Court stated: 
It is to be conceded to the Plaintiff that the 
degree of care increases in proportion to the 
hazard to be anticipated; and because of the dan-
gers inherent in the management of flowing water, 
the concept of ordinary care and prudence under 
the particular circumstances requires that its 
management not be left to novices, but should 
any be entrusted to persons of some experience 
and skill in the management of such water, who 
would have an awareness of the various hazards 
in the failure to properly control them and would 
therefore exercise the degree of foresight and 
precaution which people of such experience and 
skill would observe to avoid injury or damage 
to others . · 
503 P.2d at 140-41. 1 
The principal articulated by the Court in this case 
with respect to the degree of care that must be exercised in 
managing a known hazardous condition, applies with equal if not 
greater force, where the risk of harm is to a two and one half 
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year old girl. JENNIFER was not placed in a foster home where 
the parents were trained specifically to deal with autistic child-
ren or to deal with children who were head-bangers. Nor was 
JENNIFER placed in a therapeutic foster home where the parents 
were subsequently provided with training to deal with these pro-
blems. (R. 211). Behavior modification techniques were not taught 
to the MEIKS as a means of altering JENNIFER'S behavior (R. 216), 
and no medication for JENNIFER was ever offered (R. 211). The 
foster parents were also not provided with any special equip-
ment to deal with JENNIFER'S head banging. Dr. Sargeant testi-
fied at trial that a helmet, along with behavioral modification 
techniques or tranquilizers would have been an effective means 
of dealing with J~NNIFER'S head-banging. (R. 318-319). 
Foresight and ingenuity in dealing with a known risk 
may be necessary. In Boeing Company v. State, 89 Wash. 2d 443, 
572, P.2d 8 (1978), the owner of some jet engine brought an act-
ion against the state for damages sustained to the engine when, 
being carried by truck, they struck the underside of an underpass. 
The verdict at trial was for the Plaintiff. In affirming this 
verdict, the Supreme Court of Washington carefully analyzed the 
requirements of reasonable care in light of known risks. 
The Appellant contends that because such a system 
(photoelectric cell device) was not in common 
use ... before the accident, to require the 
city to exercise ingenuity in conceiving such 
a system is to impose a duty of extraordinary 
care upon it ... However, there are extraordin-
ary situations which may call for extraordinary 
measures in the exercise of reasonable care __ 
-30-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'· 
Here, the Respondent's evidence showed a past 
history of frequent accidents in spite of the 
warning sign posted. It further showed.the Ap-
pellant's awareness of the need for a more effect-
ive warning system and that in other similar cir-
cumstances, governmental bodies had devised warning 
system to meet the problem. This evidence was 
sufficient to take to the jury the question whether 
the .Appellant exercised reasonable care under 
the circumstances. The jury would reasonably 
conclude that the situation called for some ingen-
uity in the solution of the problem presented. 
• • • 
572 P.2 at 11-12, citation omitted. 
JENNIFER'S problem, in a very real sense, called for extra care-
ful measures in the exercise of. due care. JENNIFER had been 
diagnosed as having autistic tendencies and the Division of Fam-
ily Services was made aware of JENNIFER'S head-banging and thus, 
of the need for a more effective treatment program. There were 
treatment options available to the Division of Family Services. 
The Court, sitting as the trier of fact, could reasonably con-
elude, given the scope of the duty involved, "that the situa-
tion called for some ingenuity in the solution of the problem 
presented." 
The scope of the duty a state agency owes to depend-
ent foster children was considered by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court. In Vonner v. State 273 So. 2d 253 (La. 1973), the Welfare 
Department had acted in derogation of its own policies requiring 
periodic visits and medical examination of foster childr~n, as 
well as ignoring complaints by the mother and child that the 
child was being treated cruelly. The court noted that the alleg-
ed beatings extended over a period of time and could or should 
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have been discovered by "conscientious performance of regular 
visitation and annual medical examination prescribed by the De-
partment's own regulation." The Court concluded: 
When the department obtains or accepts the cus-
: tody of children, it becomes directly responsible 
for their care and well being. It cannot insulate 
itself from this responsibility by contracting 
it out to others to fulfill. For the reason to 
be noted, the Department is vicariously liable 
for the acts of the foster parents insofar as 
they breached the duty of the Department (exercised 
through them) for the child's well being ... 
It is the Department, not the foster parents, 
who has the legal custody of the child and, con-
sequently, "the right and responsibility to pro-
vide for the physical, mental, moral and emotion-
al well being of the child." 
(emphasis added). 
A careful reading of Judge Rigtrup's holding discloses 
no imposition of anything approaching absolute liability upon 
the Division of Family Services. The Judge stated: 
The Court finds that the special problems of the 
child were known, the risks to the child were 
known or should have been known by the Division 
of Family Services. The Court recognizes that 
the MEIKS were qualified parents, were good par-
ents, were conscientious parents, but they did 
not receive very straightforward, simple informa-
tion from the Division which was available and 
at their disposal and which would have afforded 
the child a good deal of protection . . . 
The Court finds that the Division of Fa~ily Ser-
vices violated its duty to protect the child, 
given all the existing circumstances. (R. 461). 
It was clearly the trial Court's role to determine 
the scope of Division of Family Services' Duty in light of the 
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state statute, case law, and the facts presented. As was pointed 
out by the Colora~o Supreme Court in Metropolitan Gas Repair 
~rvices v. Kuli~, 621 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1980), "whether a Defendant 
owes a legal duty to a particular Plaintiff is a question of 
law The Court determines as a matter of law, the existence 
and scope of the duty - that is, whether the Plaintiffs' interest 
that has been infringed by the conduct of the Defendant is en-
titled to legal protection." 621 P.2d at 317, citation omitted. 
The Division of Family Services was aware of JENNIFER'S 
behavioral disabilities, was aware of the risk of harm that was 
created thereby, and was under a clear legal duty to act with 
due care considering these circumstances. The Division of Fam-
ily Services clearly breached their duty. 
POINT THREE 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DIVISION 
OF FAMILY SERVICES WAS THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF JENNIFER LITTLE. 
In Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 263 P.2d 287 (Utah 
1953), the Plaintiff brought an action for the death of an auto-
mobile passenger who was killed when the automobile crashed into 
the Defendant corporations truck which was parked partly in the 
street. The Court, in ~iscussing the issue of proximate cause, 
observed: 
In addressing the question whether the parking 
of the truck on the highway was an act of negli-
gence, it should be remembered that an act is 
not necessarily rendered non-negligent merely 
because it may be said that no injury would re-
sult to another except for some subsequent act 
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of negligence. One is guilty of negligence where 
he does such an act or omits to take such a pre-
caution that under the circumstances present as 
an ordinary prudent person, he ought reasonably 
to foresee that he will thereby expose the inter-
est of another to an unreasonable -risk of harm. 
When one does so he may be held liable for re-
sulting injuries caused by any reasonably fore-
seeable conduct, whether it be innocent, negligent 
or even criminal. 
263 P.3d at 290, footnotes omitted. 
Thus, the Division of Family Services' failure to pro-
vide protective headgear for JENNIFER, or to adequately train 
the Meiks to cope with JENNIFER'S head-banging is not rendered 
non-negligent merely because JENNIFER might not have died except 
for the concurring action of FLOYD HOOTEN, another foster child. 
The Division of Family Services omitted to take the necessary 
precaution, the lack of which they should have reasonably foreseen 
would have resulted in grave risk to JENNIFER'S life. Indeed, 
Dr. Serge M. Moore, the medical examiner, testified: 
There is evidence to the effect that there were 
bruises on the scalp of various ages, and there 
were some injuries in various stages prior to 
the time of death. In all probability, and most 
likely with such probability as one can say in 
medicine, these were part of an aggregate epi-
sode or episodes that eventually lead to the final 
inJury or contributed to the death as a result 
Oitlie final injury." (R. 286). 
The parameters of what const.itutes "reasonably foresee-
..... 
able" was exami~ed by the Court in Rees v. Albertson Inc., 587 
P.2d 130 (Utah 1978). In discussing the liability of a store 
in selling beer to a minor, the Court stated: 
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What is necessary to meet the tort of negligence 
and proximate cause in that it be reasonably fore-
seeable, not that the particular accident would 
occur, but only that there is a likelihood of 
an occurrence of the same ~eneral nature. In that 
connection, it is to be ha iri mind that the jury 
is entitled to base its judgment, not only upon 
the facts shown, but to indulge such reaonable 
inferences as may be fairly drawn therefrom. 
587 P.2d at 133. (emphasis added). 
Considering that JENNIFER had been diagnosed as having 
autistic tendencies and was battering herself to the extent that 
her face and forehead were constantly covered with bruises (R. 
213), it was reasonably foreseeable that she would suffer some 
severe head injury. The Division of Family Services' breach 
of its legal duty to protect JENNIFER was the proximate cause 
of her death. As the Court noted in Anderson v. Red-E-Mix Pav-
ing Company, 24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970): "We have indica· 
ted our agreement with the well established rule that where one 
is injured by the concurrent negligence of two wrongdoers, he 
can recover from either or both, and this includes circumstances 
where one has previously created a dangerous condition, which 
combined with a later act of negligence ... " 467 P.2d at 47. 
In Utah, to constitute the proximate cause of an acci-
dent, the negligence that is committed must be a substantial 
factor in bringing about the harm or result. Hall v. Blackham 
18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 (1966). The Arizona Supreme Court, 
in McDowell v. Davis, 104 Ariz. 69, 448 P.2d 869 (1964), held 
that a trial court erred in instructing a jury that "an act or 
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omission cannot be a proximate cause if it contributes only 
slightly or possibly to the result." In evaluating the use of 
the term "substantial factor" in tort actions, the Court conclud-
ed: "It is not how little or how large a cause is that makes 
it a legal cause, for a proximate cause is any cause which in 
a natural and continuous sequence produces the injury and without 
which the result would not have occurred." 448 P.2d at 871-72. 
(emphasis in original). 
Respondent asserts vigorously that absent the Division 
of Family Services' breach of their legal duty, absent their 
failure to provide JENNIFER LITTLE with protective headgear, 
absent their failure to provide proper training and therapeutic 
drugs, and responsible protection, JENNIFER would be alive today. 
In a case such as this, the causal issue is dependent 
upon the question of the scope of the duty involved. Thode, 
Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational 
Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury," 1977 Utah Law 
Review 1, 28. The interrelation of these two factors, often 
glossed over by courts, was explicitly analyzed and used to serve 
as the basis of liability in Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321, 
534 P.2d 1360 (1975). In this case Bitton was being pursued 
upon a public highway by officers of the Seattle Police Department 
and the Washington State Patrol. One police officer attempted 
to form a moving roadblock ahead of Bitton, who seeing the road-
block, attempted to accelerate past the officer. Bitton crossed 
over the median and collided with Mason's car. The occupants 
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of both cars were killed. The Plaintiff brought action against 
Bitton, the city, and the state. The trial court held that as 
a matter of law the conduct of the city and state was not a prox-
imate cause of Mason's death, which, in fact resulted sotely 
from the collision with Bitton's car. The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington, sitting en bane reversed the holding of the trial judge. 
The Court first took notice of a state statute covering the duty 
owed by law enforement officials to the public in regard to the 
operation of emergency vehicles. The Court then noted: 
Directly connected with the question of duty is 
tFie issue of proximate cause. Having erroneously 
limited the scope of the Defendant's duty, the 
trial court concluded that the sole and proximate 
cause of Mason's injuries was his collision with 
the unlawfully driven vehicle, thereby exonerating 
the Defendants from liability. The fact that 
Bitton was obviously guilty of negligent conduct, 
Wllich had a causal effect on the ultimate injuries 
incurred by Mason, does not necessarily relieve 
the Defendants of their potential liability, since 
the law does not require that there be but one 
proximate cause for any given event ... 
Washington, like an overwhelming majority of juris-
dictions, recognizes that if two individuals commit 
independent acts of negligence which occur to 
produce the proximate cause of an injury to a 
third person, they are to be regarded as concurrent 
tort feasors, and each is liable as if solely 
responsib~e for the injury caused by the concurrent 
acts of negligence. 
534 P.2d at 1363-64 citation omitted (emphasis 
added). 
In the present case, it was not conclusively adduced 
that the blows FLOYD HOOTEN struck were in any direct sense re- . 
sponsible for JENNIFER'S death. Evidence presented at trial 
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indicated that JENNIFER did not show any evidence of skull frac-
ture or any laceration. (R. 272). There was evidence of numer-
ous bruises on her face; sustained over a period of perhaps one 
or two weeks (R. 274). But even granting that JENNIFER'S death 
was the result of an aggregate trauma induced by her headbanging 
and FLOYD HOOTEN'S blows, this would not relieve the Division 
of Family Services of their liability. It was clearly foreseeable 
that JENNIFER might suffer a harm of the general nature which 
in fact occurred. 
In Cook v. Mortensen, 624 P.2d 675 (Utah 1981), a ten-
ant, attempted to open some windows which had been negligently 
painted shut by his landlord. To accomplish this, the tenant 
constructed a platform out of garbage cans and, while barefoot, 
climbed atop this platform, fell, and sustained some injuries. 
The Court, in wisely dismissing Plaintiff's claim, noted: "One 
who is aware of a potentially dangerous condition and fails to 
take appropriate evasive action, or, as here, affirmatively acts 
in a manner that actively aggravates the otherwise latent negli-
gence of the Defendant, cannot later be heard to complain against 
that negligence." (624 P.2d at 670). This admonition is more 
applicable here to Appellant than Respondent. It was not JENNIFER 
LITTLE who was aware of a potentially dangerous condition and 
failed to take appropriate evasive action, it was the Division 
of Family Services. It was not JENNIFER LITTLE that activated 
the negligence of the Division of Family Services, it might only 
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perhaps have been FLOYD HOOTEN. The duty of the Division of 
Family Services to JENNIFER LITTLE clearly encompassed an affir-
mative obligation to take into account JENNIFER'S behavioral 
disabilities and to assure that she would not be cared for by 
those - the MElKS, FLOYD HOOT~N, or others - without the ability 
or training to properly do so. The problem could have been dealt 
with by placing her in a therapeutic foster home specifically 
trained to deal with autistic children. Family Services could 
have trained the MEIKS to deal with JENNIFER'S head-banging, 
with methods such as behavior modification. The Division of 
Family Services, aware of the severity of JENNIFER'S head-banging, 
could have provided the MEIKS with protective head gear - one 
of the standard protections against injury from head-banging. 
(R. 321-322). None of these acts were attempted by the Division 
of Family Services. These omissions were a clear breach of its 
legal duty to protect JENNIFER and were the proximate cause of 
her death. 
DEAN LEON GREEN has provided some guidance in deter-
mining whether the duty incumbent upon a Defendant extends to 
the harm suffered by the Plaintiff. He states: 
The determination of the issue of duty and whe-
ther it includes the particular risk imposed on 
the victim ultimately rests upon broad policies 
which underlie the law. There policies may be 
characterized generally as morality, the econ-
omic good of the group, practical administration 
of the law, justice as between the parties and 
other consideration relative to the environment 
out of which the case arose. They are found in 
all decisions whether based on former decisions 
of the Court or on a fresh consideration of the 
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factors found in the current environment. It need 
not be added that the scope or extent of duty 
in any case can only be resolved by the learning, 
experience, good sense and judgment of the judge 
- the molding of law in response to the needs 
of the environment. 
Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines 41 Texas 
Law Review 42, 45 (1962). 
POINT FOUR 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
PERMITTING DR. JANICE SARGENT 
TO TESTIFY. 
Rule 56(2) states: 
If the witness is testifying as an expert, testi-
mony of the witness in the form of opinion or 
inferences is limited to such opinions as the 
judge finds are (a) based on facts or data per-
ceived by or personally known or made known to 
the witness at the hearing, and (b) within the 
scope of the special kowledge, skill, experience 
or training possessed by the witness. 
Facts and data can be "made known to the witness at 
the hearing" through the use of hypotheticals. Wigmore, in dis-
cussing the use of hypotheticals at trial, observed: 
The reasoning may be explained in the following 
proposition: (1) testimony in the shape of infer-
ence or conclusion rests always on certain pre-
mises of fact ... (2) These premises, a consider-
ation of which is essential to the formation of 
the conclusion or cpinion, ~ust scmchow be sup-
plied to the jury by testimony. The same witness 
may supply both premises and conclusions; or one 
witness may supply the premises and another the 
conclusion . . . 
2. Wigmore on Evidence, 792, Section 672. (em-
phasIS in original). 
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The testimony of DR. SARGEANT clearly falls within 
these parameters. The premises relating to autistic behavior 
were supplied by the findings of the Juvenile Court, which stated 
that JENNIFER "manifested autistic behavior" (R. 159-160). Fur-
ther foundation was supplied by the testimony of LOIS RUDD, who 
filed the original Juvenile Court Petition relating to JENNIFER 
LITTLE~ In response to a question from Plaintiff's attorney as 
to why she filed the dependency petition, Ms. RUDD answered: 
"The child exhibited some autistic behavior. the child was 
its on the Petition. I think she was about two years old. 
She was not talking, she was not potty trained." (R. 197). 
Adequate foundation was also established for DR. SAR-
GEANT' S testimony concerning problems arising with children who 
begin head-banging at age two and one-half. Evidence was pro-
duced establishing JENNIFER'S head-banging behavior in the foster 
home (R. 297). Evidence was also presented at trial that JENNI-
FER had never exhibited head-banging behavior in her own home 
(R. 364). That the expert witness, DR. SARGEANT, did not have 
personal knowledge of these events is, as this Court noted in 
Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah.1977), not relevant. 
In that case, the Defendants were forced to sell their livestock 
pursuant to an injunction issued by the city. The Plaintiffs 
objected to the testimony of an expert in livestock management 
as to the losses Defendant has suffered, claiming the expert 
witness had no actual knowledge regarding the Defendant's busi-
_lJ. l -
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ness. The Court ruled: 
In regard to Plaintiff's specific objection that 
Mr. Evans did not have first-hand knowledge of 
the Defendant's operation and therefore should 
not have been permitted to testify, that objection 
is without merit because the expert aoes not need 
to have any such specific knowledge and he did 
not pretend that -he did so. His testimony was 
as to matters that would apply to any similar 
situation. 
571 P.2d at 1319 (emphasis added). 
Further foundation for DR. SARGEANT'S testimony was 
established when in response to a question from co-counsel for 
the Defendant relating to knowledge of JENNIFER'S head-banging 
which she had obtained independently of any discussion with coun-
sel for the Plaintiff, DR. SARGEANT stated: 
"Ye.s, yes, I do. I read the deposition and there 
were references to " (R. 327). 
In Stickelvan v. Moroni, 632 P.2d 1159 (Nev. 1981), the Supreme 
Court of Nevada held that it was not an abuse of discretion for 
a trial judge to receive the expert witness testimony of an en-
tomology professor who had reviewed depositions and summaries 
of evidence. 
The foundation for DR. SARGE'AJNT'S testimony had an 
adequate basis in hypotheticals presented by counsel for the 
Plaintiffs and in her reading of the deposition and was not bas-
ed on what she was told by Plaintiff's counsel. Where an "ade-
quate foundation" for an expert witnesses' testimony is estab-
lished, the Court has not required that the expert testify as 
an eyewitness. Shurtleff v. Jay Taft and Company, 622 P.2d 1168, 
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1173 (Utah 1980). 
In Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 414 P.2d 575 
(1966), doubt was cast upon the sufficiency of expert testimony 
presented by a police officer concerning an automobile accident. 
The Court stated: 
It must be conceded that evidence which amounts 
to mere guesswork should not be admitted . . . 
Whether the officer has sufficient background 
. . . is primarily for the trial court to deter-
mine. If in his judgment the evidence will be 
of [] assistance, frailties therein which may 
be evident from his testimony or from cross-exam-
ination, go to the wei ht of his testimon , rather 
I an its a missa 1 ity. e etermination made 
by the trial court should be given some credit 
and should not be overturned unless it is made 
clearly to appear that he was in error in his 
judgment and that it resulted in substantial pre-
judice. 
414 P.2d at 578 (emphasis added). 
DR. SARGEANT'S testimony had adequate foundation in 
the record and its admissibility did not result in any undue 
prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondents, JONATHAN and HANNAH LITTLE, request 
the Court to affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f~ay of May, 1982. 
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Delivered, via TRS, two copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Respondents to Sharon Peacock and Craig L. Barlow, Assistant 
Attorneys General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this ~~ay of May, 1982. 
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